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Abstract: Slotting allowances are fees paid by manufacturers to get access to
retailers’ shelf space. Both in the USA and Europe, the use of slotting allowances
has attracted attention in the general press as well as among policy makers and
economists. One school of thought claims that slotting allowances are eﬃciency
enhancing, while another school of thought maintains that slotting allowances are
used in an anti-competitive manner. In this paper, we argue that this controversy is
partially caused by inadequate assumptions of how the retail market is structured
and organized. Using a formal model, we show that there are good reasons to
expect anti-competitive eﬀects of slotting allowances. We further point out that
competition authorities tend to use an unsatisfactory basis for comparison when
analyzing welfare consequences of slotting allowances.
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1 Introduction
Slotting allowances are fixed fees that manufacturers pay to retailers in order to get
access to their shelf space. While slotting allowances were hardly known before the
late 80’s, they are now widely used, not least in the grocery industry. The boost of
slotting allowances has coincided with a trend towards higher retail concentration.
In Europe, in particular, the grocery retailing sector has become strikingly more
concentrated over the last decades (Dobson and Waterson, 1999, and Clarke et al.,
2002). Thereby retailers’ market power over manufacturers has increased, and there
is a broad consensus that this is the major reason why the use of slotting allowances
has become more widespread.2 However, economists (and policy makers) disagree
as to whether slotting allowances tend to mitigate retail competition. The main
purpose of the present paper is to help resolve this controversy, and draw some
policy implications.
Two schools of thought dominate the debate over welfare eﬀects of slotting al-
lowances. The so-called market power school argues that slotting allowances may
have anti-competitive rationales (Shaﬀer, 1991). To see why, suppose that a retailer
can choose between contract A, with no slotting allowances and a low wholesale
price, and contract B, where the retailer receives a slotting allowance from the man-
ufacturer but in return pays a higher wholesale price. Since slotting allowances are
up-front payments, marginal costs for the retailer are thus relatively high in contract
B. By signing this contract, the retailer sends a signal to her rivals that she will be
a soft competitor and set a relatively high end-user price. This in turn induces the
rivals to raise their prices too. Shaﬀer shows that this mechanism may lead us to an
equilibrium where retailers use slotting allowances as a device to increase end-user
2According to a US-based survey by Bloom et al. (2000), retailers and manufactures agree that
greater retail power has contributed to more use of slotting allowances also in this country. This is
true even though retail concentration is much lower in the USA than in Europe. See also Rey, Thal
and Vergé (2005), who further note that in the UK even the products of leading manufacturers
typically ”represent a very small proportion of the total business for each of the major suppliers”.
In contrast, also the largest manufacturers are highly depend on their major buyers (Rey et al
2005, p. 3).
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prices. This has a negative welfare eﬀect.3
In contrast, the eﬃciency school argues that slotting allowances have positive
welfare eﬀects, for instance by solving problems connected to uncertainty and/or
asymmetric information, and by allocating scarce shelf space.4 The eﬃciency school
dismisses Shaﬀer’s hypothesis that slotting allowances are used as a tool to soften
retail competition, one of their main arguments being that retailers and manufac-
turers typically enter secret contracts. Thereby wholesale prices are unobservable,
and cannot be used strategically to increase end-user prices.
In our view, a main problem with both the eﬃciency and the market power
school is their assumption on how the market is structured and organized. First,
both schools of thought presuppose that there are only two layers; manufacturers
at the upstream level and retailers at the downstream level. A second presumption
they have in common, is that each retailer behaves like a vertically integrated firm
in its decision on procurement contracts and retail pricing. However, this is not a
proper description of the grocery market, especially not in Europe. Indeed, what we
have observed is that large retail chains have formed procurement alliances (buyer
groups), such that the level of concentration is higher for procurement than for re-
tailing (see Dobson and Waterson, 1999).5 In these constellations, the headquarters
of each buyer group typically deals with procurement, while the retail sub-chains
take care of retailing (e.g. end-user pricing). Even when sub-chains are fully owned
3Slotting allowances may also reduce product variety through foreclosure of smaller suppliers.
Shaﬀer (2005) shows specific market structures where such practice may be optimal. Marx and
Shaﬀer (2004) demonstrate that retailers may also benefit from foreclosure of suppliers, since this
may shift profit from the manufacture-level to the retail level.
4See further discussion in Section 3.
5The largest food buyer in Germany is the buyer group Markant Handels. The buyer groups
Euromadi and IFA Espanñola are the two largest food buyers in Spain, and Intermarché dominates
in France (Dobson and Waterson, 1999). In Norway, the largest retailer group, NorgesGruppen
(NG), was formed as a buyer group in 1994. Even though there has been a process of closer
integration, NG may still be considered as a buyer group where the headquarters takes care of
procurement, and each store brand decides end-user prices autonomously. Several of the retail
formats within NG are also independently owned by the retailers themselves. An overview of the
Nordic markets is given by the Danish Competition Authority (2005).
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by the procurement headquarters, they are typically organized as divisionalized
firms.6 We show that in this context each buyer group will use slotting allowances
to dampen intra-retailer competition even if rival retail chains cannot observe the
wholesale contracts. As long as the procurement contracts can be observed within
each buyer group, which is a plausible assumption, they can transfer their buying
power into the retail market by using slotting allowances.
This paper contains a relatively broad discussion of antitrust issues. First, we
show that our findings are supported by several antitrust investigations of the gro-
cery industry in Europe (European Commission, 1996, Competition Commission,
2000, Danish Competition Authority, 2005, and The Norwegian Competition Au-
thority, 2005). Second, we emphasize the importance of recognizing the degree of
substitutability that exists between diﬀerent kinds of vertical restraints. Consider a
buyer group of independent retailers. They cooperate in the procurement market,
but compete at the retail level. Building on our formal model, we argue that by
using a vertical restraint like a slotting allowance, the group can achieve the same
outcome as they would with vertical integration. In the latter case, decisions on pro-
curement and end-user pricing are taken by the group’s headquarters. Consequently,
it is pointless to outlaw slotting allowances if the competition authorities would not
ban a merger among alliance members. Vice versa, if a potential merger between
the firms raises serious doubts by the competition authorities, slotting allowances
should raise the same concerns.
1.1 Related Literature
The present paper is an extension of Shaﬀer (1991), who considers competition
between two retailers in the end-user market. By assuming that the retailers have
6Thus, while the headquarters decide procurement contracts centrally, each sub-chain is rela-
tively autonomous with respect to end-user pricing. The leading Finnish retailer groups, Kesko and
Tuko, are orgainized in this a way (The European Commission,1996), and the same holds for ICA’s
retailing operations in Norway (NCA, 2005). Just one of the four dominating Norwegian retailer
groups operates a completely vertically integrated firm with respect to procurement contracts and
retail pricing (NCA, 2005).
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complete bargaining power over manufacturers, Shaﬀer (1991) shows that it is in
the interest of each retailer to set a high wholesale price in the contract with the
manufacturer. When wholesale prices rise, retail competition softens. Thus the
total profit made by the vertical chain increases, and this profit is captured by the
retailers through slotting allowances.
Shaﬀer’s idea is based on the strategic delegation literature, where Fershtman
and Judd (1987) is the seminal paper. Gal-Or (1991), Bonanno and Vickers (1988)
and Rey and Stiglitz (1988, 1995) build on the same framework, but they assume
that the bargaining power is in the hands of the suppliers. Irmen (1998) shows that
the outcome in this case resembles the one found by Shaﬀer (1991). The diﬀerence is
the sign of the fixed fee.7 Consequently, the strategic delegation theory is consistent
with the observation that the use of slotting allowances has increased as bargaining
power has been transformed from the manufacturing level to the retailing level.
A critical assumption within the strategic delegation literature is that the con-
tract between a manufacturer and a retailer is irreversible, so that wholesale prices
are determined prior to the price game between retailers. We agree with Rey and
Stiglitz (1995) that this is likely to hold. The reason is that retailers rarely have
long-term contracts with their customers, while the wholesale contractual arrange-
ments often are set for no less than a year. Moreover, the type of wholesale contracts
(e.g. slotting allowances or not) will typically be specified in long-term contracts
(see e.g. discussion by Rey and Stiglitz, 1995).
The second critical assumption employed by Shaﬀer and other papers in the
same tradition, is that wholesale tariﬀs are observed by rival retailers. This assump-
tion is more dubious than that of irreversibility.8 However, we show that slotting
7If the retailers have the bargaining power, a fixed fee is paid by the suppliers, defined as a
slotting allowance. If the suppliers have the bargaining power, the fixed fee is paid by the retailers,
denoted as a franchisee fee.
8The Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) doubts that slotting allowances can be used
by retailers as a facilitating practice a la Shaﬀer (as claimed in the press), since they find the
assumption of contract observability unrealistic (NCA, 2005, and Gabrielsen and Sørgard, 2005).
However, NCA has initiated an investigation to clarify the extent of information exchange between
retailer groups.
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allowances may be used as a tool to increase end-user prices even if wholesale tar-
iﬀs are observable only within each buyer group. Indeed, this is one of the main
messages of the present paper. Consequently, we show that the boost of slotting
allowances may be related to the way the large retailer groups are organized, and
not to the increase in retail market power as such. Slotting allowances have become
more widespread at the same time as large retailer groups have started to operate
several sub-chains as buyer groups or as divisionalized companies.
Finally, our paper is related to Rey, Thal and Vergé (2005), who analyze a
context where two diﬀerentiated retailers sell goods bought from one common sup-
plier (common agency situation). Rey et al assume that the retailers have complete
bargaining power over the manufacturer, and show how retailers may use slotting al-
lowances to obtain monopoly prices in the end-user market.9 Even though Rey et al
abstract from the formation of buyer groups, and we abstract from common agency
problems, both papers thus find that slotting allowances may harm consumers by
increasing end-user prices.
2 The model
We consider a market where n retail chains sell the same homogenous product.
The consumers may diﬀer in their chain preferences. To capture this we extend
Shaﬀer (1991) to n retail chains, and use the following Shubik-Levitan (1980) utility
function:
U(q1.., qi, .., qn) = v
nX
i=1
qi −
n
2
⎛
⎝(1− b)
nX
i=1
q2i +
b
n
Ã
nX
i=1
qi
!2⎞
⎠ . (1)
The parameter v > 0 in equation (1) is a measure of the market potential, qi is
the quantity from retailer chain i, and n ≥ 1 the number of chains. The parameter
9More precisely, Rey et al show how the retailers can solve the common agency problem and
achieve monopoly profit by using slotting allowances and a conditional fixed fee (i.e., a fee which
is conditional on the retailers actually purchasing from the manufacturer). Interestingly, this kind
of tariﬀ structure may eliminate the risk of anticompetitive exclusion. This is in contrast to the
result in Marx and Shaﬀer (2004), who restrict attention to a two-part tariﬀ.
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b ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of how diﬀerentiated the chains are; they are completely
independent and have monopoly power if b = 0, while the consumers perceive them
to be identical if b = 1. More generally, the chains are closer substitutes from the
consumers’ point of view the higher is b.10 The merit of using this utility function
is that the size of the market does not vary with b or n (see Motta, 2004).
Let pi be the price charged by retail chain i. Solving ∂U/∂qi − pi = 0 for
i = 1, ...., n we find that the inverse and the direct demand curves are given by
respectively:
pi = v −
Ã
(1− b)nqi + b
nX
j=1
qj
!
and (2)
qi =
1
n
Ã
v − pi
1− b +
b
(1− b)n
nX
j=1
pj
!
. (3)
Assume that retail chain i pays wi per unit of the manufacturing good, and let
Si be the fixed fee specified in the contract between the chain and the manufacturer.
The profit level of chain i is then
πRi = (pi − wi)qi(p1, ...pn) + Si.
If Si > 0 we have a slotting allowance.
The profit level of the manufacturing firm serving chain i equals
πMi = wiqi(p1, ...pn)− Si,
where we have normalized marginal cost at the manufacturer level to zero. As in
Shaﬀer (1991), we assume that the manufacturing sector is perfectly competitive
with a large number of firms producing the same good.
Below, we consider the following two-stage game:
• At stage 1, the procurement headquarters (PHQ) of each retail chain decides
what kind of contract to oﬀer a manufacturer. Without slotting allowances, the
10Shaﬀer (1991) uses a general demand function, but uses the Shubik-Levitan specification with
n = 2 in his welfare analysis.
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manufacturing firm’s participation constraint requires that wi ≥ 0, while with
slotting allowances the PHQ sets the tariﬀ Ti = (wi, Si) such that πMi ≥ 0.11
• At stage 2 the retail chains compete in prices.
The game is solved by using backward-induction. For the moment we shall
assume that all prices are observable and irreversible. Setting ∂πRi /∂pi = 0 for
i = 1, ..., n we find that the final stage gives rise to the reaction function
pi =
nv (1− b) + wi (n− b) + b
nP
j 6=i
pj
2 (n− b) , (4)
and that the equilibrium price for chain i is given by:
p∗i =
nv (1− b) (2n− b) + (n− b)
Ã
n (2− b)wi + b
nP
j 6=i
wj
!
(n (1− b) + (n− b)) (2n− b) . (5)
The outcome of stage 1 depends on whether or not the retail chains have formed
procurement alliances. We consider these two cases separately. First we consider a
market structure without procurement alliances, as illustrated in Figure 1a (where
n = 4). This is the market structure which is typically assumed in the literature.
Second, as illustrated in figure 1b, we consider a market structure with procurement
alliances.
Each (sub-) chain consists of a large number of retail outlets, but we abstract
from the competition between these. The reason for this is that competition between
retail outlets belonging to the same sub-chain is typically eliminated through the
franchising contract between the sub-chain and its retail outlets; e.g. since the end-
user prices for the basic assortment are decided at the sub-chain level (see further
discussion in Section 3).
11While Shaﬀer (1991) assumes that the manufacturers announce the wholesale tariﬀs, we assume
that each PHQ oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-it contract. This does not aﬀect the qualitative outcome.
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2.1 Benchmark: No procurement alliances
Suppose that the retail chains do not cooperate on purchases. In the absence of
slotting allowances, perfect competition in the manufacturing sector implies that
wi = 0 and πMi = 0. In this case it follows from equation (5) that the end-user
equilibrium price equals:
pnsaB =
1− b
n (1− b) + (n− b)vn;
∂pnsaB
∂b
< 0 (6)
Equation (6) makes it clear that the end-user price is decreasing in b, reflecting
the fact that the firms have to set a lower price the higher the competitive pressure.
Note that we have marginal cost pricing (pnsaB = 0) if b = 1, since the chains are
then perceived to be perfect substitutes.
With slotting allowances, the procurement headquarters of each chain sets (wi, Si)
to maximize πRi = (p∗i −wi)q∗i (p∗1, ...p∗n) + Si subject to πMi ≥ 0. Since the manufac-
turing sector is perfectly competitive, we have πMi = 0 and wiq∗i = Si. This allows
us to write the profit level of retail chain i as πRi = p∗i q∗i (p∗1, ...p∗n). The first-order
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condition at stage 1 is consequently given by
∂πi
∂wi
=
∂p∗i
∂wi
q∗i + p
∗
i
∂q∗i
∂wi
= 0. (7)
Equations (3) and (5) further yield
∂p∗i
∂wi
=
(2− b)n (n− b)
(n (1− b) + (n− b)) (2n− b) and
∂q∗i
∂wi
=
1
n2 (1− b)
Ã
− (n− b) ∂p
∗
i
∂wi
+ b
nX
j 6=i
∂p∗j
∂wi
!
.
(8)
In this section we shall make the following critical assumption:
Assumption 1: Assume that the retail chains can commit to the wholesale tariﬀs
and that the tariﬀs are observable by the rivals.
If Assumption 1 holds, we can use equation (5) to write
∂p∗j
∂wi
=
b (n− b)
(n (1− b) + (n− b)) (2n− b) > 0 for b > 0. (9)
Retail chain i0s end-user price is increasing in its own marginal costs. Since prices are
strategic complements in retail competition, it follows that an increase in wi leads
the rivals to charge higher prices. This strategic eﬀect explains why ∂p∗j/∂wi > 0
for b > 0.
In the symmetric equilibrium we can set wi = w ∀i.12 Using equations (7) - (9),
we find that the per-unit wholesale price is given by:
wsaB = (1− b) b2
(n− 1) vn
(n− b)
¡
n2 (1− b) (3− b) + (n− b)2
¢ ≥ 0. (10)
From equation (10) we immediately see that wsaB is positive if and only if 0 <
b < 1. The reason for this is that with imperfect competition, each chain has an
incentive to choose a relatively high per-unit wholesale price in its contract with the
manufacturing firm, since this will invoke a positive price response from the rivals.
This strategic eﬀect is, however, weak for small values of b, and non-existent for
b = 0. Therefore wsaB (b = 0) = 0. It should further be noted that the direct eﬀect
12It can be shown that this is a unique equilibrium if Assumption 1 holds.
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is always stronger than the strategic eﬀect (∂pi/∂wi > ∂pj/∂wi). In particular, this
means that if a retail chain should try to set wi > 0 for b = 1, then that chain
would lose all its sales to its rivals. This explains why also wsaB (b = 1) = 0. The
incentive to set a high value on the wholesale unit-price is consequently strongest
for intermediate values of b.
Equation (10) further implies that ∂wsaB /∂n < 0, reflecting the fact that the
incentives to set a low per-unit wholesale price in order to steal business from the
competitors is larger the greater is n.
Inserting for (10) into (5) we find that the equilibrium end-user price with slotting
allowances becomes
psaB = (1− b)
(2− b) vn2
n2 (1− b) (3− b) + (n− b)2
, (11)
while the size of the slotting fee equals
S = (1− b) b2
(n− 1) v2
¡
n2 (1− b) + (n− b)2
¢
(n− b)
¡
n2 (1− b) (3− b) + (n− b)2
¢2 . (12)
Equation (12) makes it clear that the relationship between S and b is hump-
shaped, as illustrated in Figure 1.13 This is a direct consequence of the fact that wsaB
reaches a maximum for an intermediate value of b. Since wsaB is decreasing in n, we
likewise see that the slotting fee is smaller the larger the number of retail chains.
13In this figure we have set v = 10.
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Figure 1: Slotting allowances and retail competition.
Using equations (6) and (11) we further note that
4p = psaB − pnsaB =
n− b
n (1− b) + (n− b)w
sa
B ≥ 0. (13)
From (13) it is easily verified that the price diﬀerence with and without slotting
allowances is hump-shaped, just like wsaB and S. The fact that the price diﬀerence
reaches maximum for an intermediate value of b was first demonstrated by Shaﬀer
(1991).
If Assumption 1 does not hold, the wholesale unit-price cannot be used for strate-
gic purposes (since ∂p∗j/∂wi = 0 when chain j cannot observe wi). In this case it
follows that w = 0 and p = pnsaB .
We summarize the results in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Without procurement alliances:
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(i) Slotting allowances are not used if wholesale contracts cannot be observed.
(ii) Slotting allowances are used to soften competition if the consumers perceive
the retail chains to be imperfect substitutes, psaB − pnsaB > 0 for 0 < b < 1.
(iii) Slotting allowances will be highest for an intermediate degree of retail chain
substitutability.
Moreover, we have the following relationship between slotting allowances and the
number of retail chains:
Proposition 1: Slotting allowances are lower the larger the number of retail
chains.
These results are hardly surprising. Slotting allowances may be seen as a form
of nonlinear wholesale pricing, i.e. a two-part tariﬀ with a negative fixed fee. It
is well known that it is generally harder to implement non-linear pricing when the
degree of competition increases, whether this is due to a larger number of firms or
a higher substitutability. Hence, the results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 simply
resemble the outcome that two-part tariﬀs are harder to implement the stronger the
competition.
Nevertheless, Sudhir and Rao (2006) claim that price raising slotting allowances
theoretically should be higher the larger the number of chains and the less diﬀerenti-
ated they are (captured by n and b, respectively, in our model).14 In an investigation
of whether slotting allowances have anti-competitive eﬀects, the Norwegian Com-
petition Authority (2005, p. 55) likewise maintain that ”if [Shaﬀer’s] theory is any
good”, one should observe slotting allowances to be higher the fiercer the compe-
tition between the chains. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 make it clear that this is
incorrect.
We suspect the belief that slotting allowances are increasing in the extent of com-
petition, is partly caused by a lack of accuracy in distinguishing between incentives
and abilities. The stronger the competition, the more the chains have to gain from
using slotting allowances to raise prices. However, the gains from undercutting the
14See Section B1 and the appendix in Sudhir and Rao (2006).
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rivals are also particularly large if the consumers perceive the chains to be more or
less identical. Indeed, this is very much the essence of the Bertrand Paradox.
2.2 Procurement alliances among retailer chains
Two key features of the grocery retail industry have not been taken into account
in the literature. First, in most countries we observe relatively large buyer groups,
each consisting of several sub-chains (or brands). Second, while the headquarters
of the buyer groups take care of procurement activities, the sub-chains seem to be
quite autonomous with respect to end-user pricing.
Let us now assume that we have two alliances at the procurement level. For the
sake of simplicity we assume that there are two sub-chains in each buyer group, such
that n = 4, with retail chains 1 and 2 belonging to PHQ1 and chains 3 and 4 to
PHQ2. Hence, we have the market structure in Figure 1b. In order to focus on the
diﬀerences from the benchmark case, we shall now make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: Assume that wholesale contracts are observable within, but not
between, each buyer group.
We consider the same two-stage game as above, and without slotting allowances
it is straightforward to show that the price, pnsaPD, resembles the outcomes from the
previous sections. The subscript PD indicates procurement duopoly. Hence, with
n = 4 we have:
pnsaPD = p
nsa
B = 4v
1− b
8− 5b
With slotting allowances, it is useful to denote by wPHQ1i the wholesale unit price
paid by sub-chain i = 1, 2 in Alliance 1, and by wPHQ2k the corresponding prices in
Alliance 2 (for k = 3, 4). By using equation (5), we can then write the outcome in
stage 2 for the sub-chains in Alliance 1 as:
pPHQ1i =
4v (1− b) (8− b)+ (4− b)
³
4 (2− b)wPHQ1i + bw
PHQ1
j +b
³
EwPHQ23 +Ew
PHQ2
4
´´
(8− b) (8− 5b) ,
(14)
13
where E is an expectation operator and i, j = 1, 2. From equation (3) we further
find
qPHQ1i =
v
4
− 1
4 (1− b)
µ
pPHQ1i −
b
4
³
pPHQ11 + p
PHQ1
2 + p
PHQ2
3 + p
PHQ2
4
´¶
(15)
At the first stage PHQ1 solves
ΠPHQ1 = max
w1,w2
2X
i=1
(pi − wi) qi + Si
subject to wiqi + Si ≥ 0 and equations (14) and (15). Since PHQ1 cannot observe
the rival’s wholesale contract, we have ∂pPHQ11 /∂w
PHQ2
k = 0. Using that wiqi = Si,
the first order conditions for Alliance 1 is thus given by:
∂ΠPHQ1
∂wPHQ11
=
2X
i=1
Ã
∂pPHQ1i
∂wPHQ11
qPHQ1i + p
PHQ1
i
∂qPHQ1i
∂wPHQ11
!
= 0 and
∂ΠPHQ1
∂wPHQ12
=
2X
i=1
Ã
∂pPHQ1i
∂wPHQ12
qPHQ1i + p
PHQ1
i
∂qPHQ1i
∂wPHQ12
!
= 0
Because wholesale contracts are unobservable between the buyer groups, the
procurement headquarters cannot use the wholesale contracts strategically to raise
the rival’s prices. However, each buyer group is aware of the fact that the rival has in-
centives to use slotting allowances to soften competition between its own sub-chains.
Assuming that each procurement headquarters has correct expectations about the
rival’s wholesale contract (which seems reasonable, since there is no uncertainty in
the model), we find a unique symmetric equilibrium where
wsaPD = (1− b) b
2v
(4− 3b) (4− b) . (16)
As in the benchmark case, we thus see that the wholesale unit price is positive for
b ∈ (0, 1) .
By inserting for wsaPD into (14) we find that the equilibrium price in this case
equals
14
psaPD = 2
1− b
4− 3bv. (17)
Hence, the use of slotting allowances will in general increase the end-user price even
though the wholesale contracts are unobservable across the buyer groups:
psaPD − pnsaPD =
2b (1− b) v
(4− 3b) (8− 5b) > 0 for b ∈ (0, 1) . (18)
Equation (18) expresses one of the main messages of the paper, namely that
wholesale tariﬀs need not be perfectly observable for slotting allowances to increase
end-user prices.15 It is suﬃcient that the tariﬀs are observable within each buyer
group, which seems like a plausible assumption. First, it is reasonable to assume
that the sub-chains have the right of access to the accounts of the alliance. Second,
and more importantly, the sub-chains have a common interest in organizing the al-
liance system such that the wholesale tariﬀs are internally observable and credible.
Thereby, each buyer group can profitably employ price raising slotting allowances.
This is true irrespective of whether the other buyer group uses slotting allowances.
Put diﬀerently, it is a dominant strategy for each buyer groups to use slotting al-
lowances for b ∈ (0, 1) . This outcome does not depend on the symmetric market
structure.
It is straight forward to show that the end-user price is independent of whether
the sub-chains set prices competitively, as we have assumed, or whether the end-user
price is set centrally by the procurement headquarters. In both cases the end-user
price is given by equation (17). This clearly illustrates how eﬀectively slotting
allowances can be used to soften competition even if the wholesale contracts are
unobservable across the buyer alliances. The assumption that the buyer groups
have correct expectations about each other’s wholesale contracts, is of course a
simplification which is due to the information structure in the model. However,
we believe that it corresponds pretty well with reality. In its investigation of the
Norwegian retail market, the Norwegian competition authorities found that even
15With perfect observability, the wholesale contracts could be used to soften competition between
the buyer groups. This would not change the qualitative results, but would lead to even higher
end-user prices.
15
though the contracts between each buyer group and the producers were secret, the
essence of the procurement contracts was widely known. This was revealed by the
internal documents found in the investigated firms by the Norwegian Competition
Authority, and it was confirmed by the respective market participants.16
We summarize our results into the following two propositions:
Proposition 2: With procurement alliances (buyer groups) among retail chains
and b ∈ (0.1), slotting allowances will increase end-user prices even though wholesale
contracts are unobservable across buyer groups.
Proposition 3: With procurement alliances among competing retail chains,
slotting allowances are used to transfer procurement market power into the less con-
centrated retail market. The anti-competitive eﬀects of using slotting allowances are
strongest for an intermediate degree of retail substitutability.
Consequently, without slotting allowances (and other analogous vertical restraints)
the degree of retail competition depends on the number of retail chains (n) and the
degree of diﬀerentiation (b). With slotting allowances the degree of retail compe-
tition depends on the number of procurement alliances rather than the number of
retail chains. In fact, if there is a monopoly at the procurement level we have the
following result (proof, see Appendix) :
Proposition 4: With slotting allowances and procurement monopoly, the pro-
curement headquarters is able to ensure monopoly profit even if there is fierce com-
petition between the retail chains. The consumers will be charged monopoly prices
pcpPM = p
sa
PM = v/2 independent of the number of retail chains and substitutability
between the retail chains.
To counteract the eﬀects of retail chain competition, the PHQ thus sets a unit
wholesale price which is increasing in b and n if we have a procurement monopoly.
The procurement headquarters is consequently able to neutralize competition be-
tween the retail chains by choosing an appropriate wholesale unit price - the com-
bination of retail competition and slotting allowances yields the same profit and
16The Norwegian Competition Authority (2005, pp. 55).
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consumer prices as if the procurement headquarters was able to eliminate retail
competition and set the cartel prices directly. Thus, control over the end-user prices
or the wholesale price schemes has the same impact on the end-user prices and
profits.
The fact that there is a positive relationship between the size of slotting al-
lowances and the extent of retail competition if and only if we have a procurement
monopoly, has implications for empirical analysis. If Sudhir and Rao (2006) had
found support for their hypothesis that slotting allowances are increasing in retail
competition, we would have had an indication that the PHQs operate as a de facto
cartel.17 It is certainly reassuring that the data did not support this hypothesis.
Nonetheless, the results above show that competition authorities should be highly
suspect of cooperation between PHQs even if it could be proved that there is unre-
stricted competition between the retail chains. Moreover, we have recently observed
a development towards procurement alliances among large buyer groups. In Nor-
way, for instance, the three largest buyer groups (NG, ICA and Coop) are members
of a joint venture that takes care of IT-systems on logistic and transport. Such
procurement alliances may increase the information exchange between competing
buyer groups, particularly if it is in their interest to do so.18
17It should be noted that the theoretical approach employed by Sudhir and Rao is flawed. First,
they use a utility function where the size of the market and the consumers’ willingness to pay for a
good are increasing in b. Second, they make a technical error which means that they are actually
not considering a competitive equilibrium.
18In addition to the increased concentration at national level, we have witnessed cross national
mergers as well as buyer groups. Cross-national procurement alliances have so far not raised
antitrust concerns, since they generally tend to have only one member from each nation. However,
Dobson, Waterson and Davies (2003) emphasize that the inter-linkages between national and cross-
national procurement alliances combined with cross-ownership by the large multinational retailers
increase the potential for information exchange.
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3 Policy implications
The European Commission has generally approved both procurement alliances and
horizontal mergers between retailers in the market for daily consumer goods (Dobson
and Waterson, 1999, Clarke et al., 2002). One exception is the proposed merger
between two of the leading Finnish retailer groups, Kesko and Tuko, which prior to
the proposed merger had domestic market shares of approximately 40% and 20%,
respectively.19 Both Kesko and Tuko own several sub-chains, and these receive
franchising fees from the connected retailers. Procurement conditions are taken
care of by the headquarters of Kesko and Tuko, while end-user prices for the basic
assortments are decided at the sub-chain level.20
In their merger application, Kesko claimed that it was organized as a pure buyer
group with no vertical restraints limiting internal competition between their retail
sub-chains. If this were the case, one could reasonably expect strict retail com-
petition between the sub-chains and even between retailer outlets within the same
sub-chain.
However, Kesko’s argument was not accepted by the Commission. In their inves-
tigation the Commission revealed that competition between retailer outlets within
each sub-chain was severely hampered by the franchising contracts. As mentioned
above, end-user prices were decided on the sub-chain level for the basic assortment.
Moreover, the Commission found that the franchising contracts did not include fees
for the use of logotypes, slogans, marketing assistance and so forth. Instead, the sub-
chains charged the outlets for such services through adding margins on the goods
passed on to the retailers. Consequently, the retailers’ marginal costs increased,
which in turn raised end-user prices for products where each retail outlet decides
the end-user price.
By the same token, Kesko’s headquarters has incentives to implement restraints
that limit competition between sub-chains. Indeed, the Commission argues that the
relationship between the headquarters and the sub-chains resembles the relationship
19See, European Commission Decision of 20 11 1996, Case no. IV/M. 784. - Kesko/Tuko.
20Additionally, there are also some independent retail chains that cooperate with Kesko and
Tuko at the procurement level.
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between the sub-chains and the retailers: “... it has to be concluded that the
horizontal cooperation and lack of competition within each of these five Kesko chains
constitutes a structural feature of the Kesko group, and as such of the Finnish retail
market. The same is also true for whatever competition that may seem to exist
between the five chains, since the main elements of that competition have, in fact,
been centrally planned by Kesko”. Consequently, the Commission concluded that
the market power at the procurement level could be transmitted into the retail
market.
As shown in the present paper, slotting allowances may be used as an instru-
ment to soften competition between sub-chains by increasing wholesale prices. This
resembles the device used by Kesko’s sub-chains in the franchising contract with
retailers, where marketing and other support services oﬀered by the sub-chain were
added on the goods rather than charged through fixed franchising fees. Moreover, a
contract with a third party (the supplier) through slotting allowances has a higher
degree of commitment and transparency than other forms of strategic transfer pric-
ing. Other things equal, slotting allowances may be considered as a superior tool to
implement strategic transfer pricing.
Most of the eﬃciency rationales behind slotting allowances are concerned with
challenges regarding new product introduction. Under asymmetric information,
where the manufacturer has private information about e.g. product quality, slotting
allowances may be used as a signalling or screening device (Chu, 1992, Lariviere
and Padmanabhan, 1997, and Desai, 2000). However, Bloom et al. (2000) and
Rao and Mahi (2003) find no support for slotting allowances as a signalling device.
Interestingly, in their survey Bloom et al. find that neither US manufacturers nor
the retailers believe that slotting allowances serve as a signal or screening device.
The Norwegian Competition Authority reports the same view among Norwegian
manufacturers and retailers (NCA, 2005). In contrast, Sudhir and Rao (2006) and
Sullivan (1997) find some empirical support for the signalling rationale. However,
even proponents of the view that slotting allowances solve problems with asymmet-
ric information, emphasize that there may be alternative instruments.21 In cases
21Desai (2000), for instance, argues that advertising by the manufacturers is a substitute to
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where the retailer does not fear that the manufacturer will go bankrupt, buy-back
guaranties are an alternative signalling and screening device (NCA, 2005). Manufac-
turers that accept buy-back guaranties are more likely to have high quality. Slotting
allowances may also be used to balance the risk between manufacturer and retailers
regarding new products.22 However, buy-back guaranties will also be an alternative
to slotting allowances for this rationale (Sudhir and Rao, 2006).
Moreover, the degree of information asymmetry in favor of manufacturers seems
to be exaggerated. The majority of “new” products hardly gives rise to information
problems, and slotting allowances are also used for established products (Federal
Trade Commission, 2001, Competition Commission, 2000, and NCA, 2005).23
A final eﬃciency rationale is that slotting allowances help retailers to allocate
scarce shelf space in an appropriate way (Sullivan, 1997, Larivieri and Padmanab-
han, 1997 and Desai, 2000). Certainly, slotting allowances may be a way to bid
for shelf space, but other instruments exist. The obvious one is for manufacturers
to oﬀer reduction in the unit wholesale price. In a recent analysis, the Norwegian
Competition Authorities find that such rebates contingent on the access to attractive
shelf space are used in Norway (NCA, 2005).
Thus, several analyses support the hypothesis that alternative instruments exist
for the vast majority of the claimed eﬃciency benefits of using slotting allowances
(Bloom et al, 2000, Sudhir and Rao, 2006, NCA, 2005). What begs a question
then, is why do firms prefer to use slotting allowances to extract these eﬃciency
benefits? Suppose that both slotting allowances and an alternative tool may solve a
given eﬃciency problem. However, slotting allowances have the side eﬀect that they
soften retail competition. The latter eﬀect will reduce the social gain from slotting
allowances (even if the total eﬀect on welfare should be positive). Consequently, it
seems reasonable to assume that retailers prefer to use slotting allowances over an
alternative tool that just solves the eﬃciency problem. These concerns suggest that
slotting allowances in order to signal the potential of a new product. If advertising is eﬀective,
manufacturers will probably prefer to use advertising (given that the goal is only to signal quality).
22Bloom et al. (2000) find support for this among manufacturers as well as retailers.
23See e.g. Davies (2001) and Bloom et al (2000).
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antitrust authorities should not just ask whether the eﬃciency eﬀects of slotting
allowances dominate the anti-competitive eﬀects. They should also ask whether
the eﬃciency eﬀects could be achieved in other ways without the anti-competitive
side-eﬀects related to slotting allowances. Indeed, Rey and Stiglitz (1995 pp. 446)
propose that competition authorities should be suspicious towards vertical restraints
“unless there can be shown to be significant eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects that (a)
could not be obtained (at reasonable cost) in other ways, without the ensuing anti-
competitive eﬀects, and (b) that outweigh any anti-competitive eﬀects”.
Finally, our results indicate that competition authorities should have a more
critical view on procurement agreements also on logistics, transport etc.24 It is
important to emphasize that buyer groups may benefit consumers even when in-
volving competing firms.25 Our concern is, however, that the buyer power at the
procurement level may be reinforced at the retail level. Procurement alliances may
have eﬀects similar to those of cross licensing where firms reciprocally have access
to patent protected technologies. As noted by Motta (2004, pp.205 and 206) “...
the best situation for competition would arise when cross licenses are royalty free,
or when they specify fixed payments rather than unit royalties, as the latter would
amount to higher variable costs and reduced output”. Thus, Motta (2004) empha-
sizes that competition authorities should scrutinize “ancillary restraints” that call
for payments of per-unit royalties to the joint venture. This is exactly what slotting
allowances do - they implement per unit royalties to the procurement alliance.
24The use of slotting allowances may be a part of a more comprehensive choice of procurement
system (IT, logistic and transport systems). Göx (2000) shows that when transfer prices are not
observable, a strategic alternative may be to commit to an accounting system which deviates from
marginal cost pricing. When average costs are above marginal costs, a commitment to an account-
ing system based on full cost based transfer prices may resemble the outcome with observable
transfer pricing. By the same token, the choice of a procurement system that incorporates slotting
allowances may be a way to commit to transfer prices above the marginal costs.
25However, as shown by Dobson and Waterson (1997) countervailing buyer power may have
negative welfare eﬀects even without ancillary restraints.
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4 Concluding remarks
Both in the USA and in Europe, the use of slotting allowances has attracted attention
in the general press as well as among policy makers and economists. In Norway,
which has the highest retail concentration in Europe26, slotting allowances generated
a widespread debate during winter and spring 2005. The press claimed that the
retailers used slotting allowances to dampen end-user competition, and in this paper
we have shown that the emergence of large buyer groups has increased the potential
for using slotting allowances to raise prices. As long as wholesale contracts are
observable within each buyer group, slotting allowances may harm competition.
Hence, the extensive and increased use of slotting allowances is consistent with the
increase in buyer groups and divisionalized retailer groups that operate several retail
sub-chains.
If the rationale behind slotting allowances and high wholesale prices is simply
to reduce competition within a given buyer group, the practice may be seen as a
form of strategic transfer pricing. An alternative could be that the procurement
alliance operates a warehouse that charges the sub-chains a transfer price above
the wholesale price.27 Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2005), in a study for the Norwegian
Competition Authority, maintain that there is no reason why firms should prefer
to use slotting allowances as a way to practice strategic transfer pricing. However,
this argument hardly holds if there is also competition between retailers belonging
to diﬀerent buyer groups. The reason is that a contract with a third party (the
manufacturer) has a higher commitment value than manipulation of internal transfer
prices. Consequently, we believe that slotting allowances have a higher strategic
potential than pure internal transfer pricing.
Theoretical as well as empirical analyses indicate that eﬃciency enhancing and
anti-competitive rationales for slotting allowances coexist. Regarding policy implica-
tions, our main message is that analyses of slotting allowances should try to integrate
eﬃciency enhancing and anti-competitive eﬀects. Competition authorities should
26The four dominating retail groups controlled 99.7% of the retail grocery market in 2000.
27See e.g. Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997).
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recognize the fact that alternative instruments exist for eﬃciency enhancing motives
as well as for anti-competitive motives. When retailers (or manufacturers) prefer
to use slotting allowances to solve eﬃciency problems, even if alternative instru-
ments exist, there is reason to believe that slotting allowances have anti-competitive
side-eﬀects that benefit the firms.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
Maintaining the assumption that the retail chains compete in prices, the solution
to the last stage is given by equations (4) and (5) also with a procurement monopoly.
At stage 1 the PHQ monopoly oﬀers each manufacturer a take-it-or-leave-it con-
tract, and maximizes aggregate profit for the retailers:
max
w1,..,wn
nX
i=1
{(pi − wi) qi + Si} ,
subject to wiqi + Si ≥ 0 and equations (4) and (5). This gives rise to a unique
symmetric equilibrium with
wsaPM = b
n− 1
2 (n− b)v. (19)
Diﬀerentiation of (19) yields
∂wsapm
∂b
=
vn (n− 1)
2 (n− b)2
> 0 and
∂wsapm
∂n
=
(1− b) bv
2 (n− b)2
> 0.
To counteract the eﬀects of retail chain competition, the PHQs thus set a unit
price which is increasing in b and n. Indeed, inserting for (19) into (5) we find that
psaPM = v/2, which is identical to the monopoly price.Q.E.D.
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